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Mr. Justice J. Hay Brown, of the Suprene Court of Pennsylvania, has signified his willingness to deliver the Commiencenlent address before the Law School,
on June 4th, 1901.
ALUMNI NOTES.
D. Edward Long, '99, is a prominent
candidate for District Attorney in Frank]in county.
John F. S. Morris, '94, spent several
days in town quite recently. He is, at
present, representing Ginn & Co. in Pennsylvania.
J. Frey Gilroy,"'96, spent several days
in town about April 28th. He reports
having a very lucrative practice, and is
also a borough solicitor for a borough in
Lackawanna county.
Ruby R. Vale, '99, and Jas. B. O'Keefe
sipent several days in town about May 3.
Garrett B. Stevens, '99, was a visitor in
town several days ago.

BOOK REVIEWS.
"American Bankruptcy Reports," on
tie Act of 1898. Two volumes, yearly,
with monthly advance sheets. Bound in
sheep, $5.00 per volume. Matthew Bender,
Albany, N. Y.
Four volumes of these reports have been
given to the profession and the fifth will
be out soon.
The usefulness and benefits of such
reports are manifest and hardly need comment but we cannot pass them by without
referring to the manner of their compilation and annotations, which is perfect, and
especially the indexing as to the form and
its reference to the adjudication of each
section of the act, being arranged to meet
the wants of the busy attorney.
"The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy,"
by Win. Miller Collier. Third edition,
revised and enlarged, by James W. Eaton,
of the Albany, N. Y., Bar, Albany, N. Y.,
1900. Matthew Bender, pp. xliv, 866.
Our National Bankruptcy Act has now
been in force nearly three years and during
that brief period most of its sections have
been judicially construed. Students and
practitioners must therefore now be pro-
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vided with a work which not only suggests
the lroblems presented by the provisions
of the law, but which indicates the way in
which, so far as passed upon, they have
been solved by the courts.
Such a
work is that before us. Mr. Collier and
Mir. lEaton are well known as the editors
of time excellent American Bankruptcy
Reports, and are both acknowledged
authorities oil
-lankruptcy Law. The
original edition of the book, whioh was
lrepared by Mr. Collier and which came
out two months after the enactment of
the law, was very favorably received by
the profession and there can be no doubt
that the present enlarged and revised edition will prove just as popular.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the
work is its completeness. The text proper
consists of some four hundred and eighty
pages, in which each section of the act is
fully discussed and explained, in the light
both of the decisions under the present act
and of the text and construing decisions
of former statutes. In addition to this,
the book contains The General Orders in
Bankruptcy, annotated, and cross-referenced: Index to General Orders, Official
Forms, Index to Official Forms, the Bankruptcy Acts of 1898, 1867, 1841 and 1800,
the Rules in Equity of the United States
Courts,Index to Rules in Equity, Abstracts
of the Exemption Laws of the different
States and Territories, List of Judges and
Clerks of Bankruptcy Courts, General
Index and Table of Cases.
"Where Dwells the Soul Serene," by
Stanton Kirkhamn Davis. Cloth, pp. 220,
price $1.25. The Alliance Pub. Co., N. Y.
This book is written from the standpoint
of an eminently practical idealism and
from the ground that the perception of
the soul is the basis of freedom and thence
of all true culture. Tle author states in
his preface that, "It should be the aim of
every earnest book to act in some degree,
however slight, as a medium of personal
truth; and herein lies its use, should itattain
to the dignity of usefulness, that it shall
arouse some dormant faculty, shall animate our latent perception of the Immanent Soul." That the author has reached
this degree of perfection stated in his preface cannot be doubted, and any reader of

the book call come to no other conclusion
than that the book has fully reached the
degree of perfection the author has aimed
at. The key-note of the book is Love-the
love of God, the love of man, the love of
nature; but this is religion, and thus is it
a plea for all that is true and vital in religion ; religion not for set lines and set
places, but for all days and all times-the
religion of Love. A free and rugged spirit
pervades the book; it radiates health for it
was written in the open air and constantly
suggests the woods and fields Above all
it isserene and hopeful and from beginning
to end is suggestive of peace. It is an antidote for the fever and unrest of the times
and carries the reader to the unexplored
recesses of his own being and sels him to
vibrating with the real.
"The Esoteric Art of Living," by Joseph
Stewart, LL. M. Cloth, pp. 80, price$0.75.
The Alliance Pub. Co., N. Y.
This book suggests original studies in the
philosophy of thehigher life, comprehending the concepts of advanced thought and
some deductions from modern Psychical
Research; the purpose being to show how
the rarer knowledge of mai's powers, both
normal and supernormal, and their proper
exercise may be rationally made the basis
for a happier, healthier, profounder and
loftier life, not only in extraordinary but
in daily experience. A glance at the introduction will serve well to illustrate the
character of the book. "Forall experience
(living) there is a common basis, which
may' be found in the inherent potential
nature of man and his adjustment to environment.
The diversity of expression
and adjustment is as great as the multitude
of individuals. Not all expressions and
adjustments are happy, beneficent; wise
or progressive. Surely it is desirable to
discriminate and to inquire as to what will
facilitate the best expression of the innate
powers and possibilities and effect the
most beneficent adjustment to environment."
Tile following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Court cases
issued in last month's FoRum.
Case No. 147. Nicholls,
Turner,
Core,
Lambert.
Clark, J.
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Case No. 148. Kostenbauder, Thorne,
Stauffer, G.M.. Mowry.
Kline, J.
"

149. Points,

Lonergan,

Lord,

150.
15.
152.
153.

154.
"

Peightel.
MacConnell, J.
Detrich,
Bishop,
Dever,
Osborne.
Kemp, J.
Mitchell,
Holconb,
Alexander,
Graul.
Stauffer, J.
Kern,
Basehore,
Marx,
Edwards.
Valentine, J.
Hoagland,
Hebriegel,
Fox,
Lauer.
Gery, J.
Rhodes, J.,
Barr,
Trude,
Davis.
Hess, J.

"

155. Miller,

"

Kline,
Hickernell.
Turner, J.
156. Donahoe,
Vastine,
Bouton,
Gerber.
Adamson, J.

Cannon,

MOOT COURT.
THE HANOVER FIRE INSURANCE
CO.vs. THOMAS BRADFORD.
Authority of insurance agent to appoint
sub-agents-Liability of agent for the
acts of such .sub-agent-Extent of apparent authority of sub-agent in isuing
policy of insurance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

1. The defendant was the agent of the
plaintiff company at New Brighton, Pa.,
to receive proposals for insurance against
loss and damage by fire, to fix rates of premium, to receive moneys, to countersign,
issue and renew policies of insurance,
signed by the Ptesident and attested by the
Secretary of the company.
2. The defendant maintained an office
for the conducting of the insurance business, he being the agent for several insurance companies, and in the prosecution of
said business he had in his employment
one H. N. W. Hoyt, who not only did all
the clerical work of the office, but also

made daily reports of business to the plaintiff's general agent for Pennsylvania at
Wilkesbarre, and further in the regular
course of business and with defendant's
knowledge and by his authority, solicited
insurance; collected premiums, and from
time to time delivered policies of insurance
to the person insured.
3. The Mayer Pottery Works situate in
the vicinity of New Brighton, had been
insured by policies aggregating $15,000
issued by companies other than the plaintiff and these policies the insured had procured through the defendant as the representative of the companies. Shortly before
July 1, 1896, Joseph Mayer, one of the
proprietors of those works, addressed a
letter to the defendant at New Brighton,
calling his attention to the fact that these
policies would expire on the last mentioned
date, and desiring information whether
he, the defendant, would continue the
insurance in companies represented by
him. In response to this letter the said
H. N. W. Hoyt visited said Mayer and
informed him that the policies would be
renewed; and on July 1, 1896, said Hoyt,
acting on behalf of the defendant, brought
to said Mayer and delivered to him six
policies of insurance, amounting together
to $15,000, against loss by fire, upon the
said pottery works and the contents thereof. One of the policies so delivered by
said Hoyt to said Mayer was policy No.
307,782 of the Hanover Fire Insurance
Company (the plaintiff company) dated
July 1, 1896, signed by the President and
attested by the Secretary of the company
and purporting to be countersigned by
Thomas Bradford, the defendant, as agent
of the company whereby in consideration
of the prenrium of $37.,50 that company insured J. & E. Mayer and the Mayer Pottery
Company, Limited, for the term of one
year from date against loss by fire to an
amount not exceeding $2,500, to the Mayer
Pottery Works.
4. On the 8th day of July, 1896, the insured mailed a check for $225, the amount
of the premiums on said six policies, payable to the order of Thomas Bradford, in a
letter addressed to him at New Brighton.
On July 11, 1896, this check, indorsed by
said Hoy t thus-"For the credit of Thomas
Bradford, agent" was deposited by Hoyt in

THE FORUM.
the defendant's bank to the credit of the
defendant, as agent, in his bank account, as
agent. The check was paid by the drawee
to the bank.
5. Such risks as that covered by policy
No. 307,782 were and had long been prohibited by the plaintiff company and the
defendant knew of this prohibition.
6. Said policy was not countersigned by
the defendant personally but said Hoyt
countersigned the policy for and in the
name of the defendant by writing the defendant's name at the proper place. This
he did without authority from the defendant and without the defendant's knowledge. Hoyt delivered said policy to Mayer
without the defendant's consent or knowledge. The defendant had no knowledge
that this policy had been issued until after
the fire and loss hereinafter to be mentioned.
7. The issuing of said policy was not
reported to the plaintiff company and the
plaintiff had no knowledge whatever of
the transaction until after the fireand loss
had occurred.
8. On October 21, 1896, the said insured
property was destroyed by fire.
9. Afterwards suit was brought in the
Court of Common Pleas of Beaver county,
Pa., by the insured against the Hanover
Fire Insurance Company upon said policy,
and verdict and judgment was had
against the Hanover Fire Insurance Company for $2,529.20 and costs, $43.16. Two
days after the insurance company paid the
amount of the judgment and costs.
10. Although Bradford was not notified
by the Hanover Insurance Company to
defend in the suit brought against the
company in the Common Pleas of B3aver
county, yet it is admitted by both sides in
the present case, that Bradford had no defense to offer even had he been notified.
This is an action of trespass on the case
to recover from Bradford damages for defendant's wrongful and fraudulent acts
and omissions. Hanover Fire Insurance
Company is a New York corporation.
F. L. HESS and W. L. SHIPMAN for
plaintiff.
The so-called sub-agent was a clerk or
employee of the defendant, agent. Bodine
v. Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Grady v. Ins.
Co., 60 Mo. 116; Con. Ins. Co. v. Ruckman,

127 Ill. 364, Story on Agency, sees. 13, 217,
387.
The agent is liable to the principal for
the acts of his sub-agent. Barnard v.
Coffin, 141 Mass. 37; Sun Fire Office v.
Ermintrout, 11 Pa. C. C. 21; Bradstreet v.
Emerson, 72 Pa. 124; Bank v. Express
Co., 93 U.S. 174. Aninsuranceagent who
issues a policy forbidden by the company,
is liable to the company. Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 1 Spr. 320; Craber v. Ins. Co., 129
Pa. 8.
The sub-agent was acting within the
apparent scope of his authority. Kitchen
v. Ins. Co., 57 Mich. 145; Swan v. Ins.,
Co., 96 Pa. 42; Grieswold v. Gebbie, 126
Pa. 353.
W. A. VALENTINE and W. T. STAUFFER
for defendant.
An insurance agent with authority to
solicit insurance, collect premiums, and
deliver policies has no apparent authority
to contract for risks. Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
23 Pa. 72; Ins. Co. v. Holzgrafe, 53 Ill. 56;
Fleming v. Ins. Co., 42 Wis 620; Ins. Co.
v. Willets, 24 Mich. 267; Greene v. Ins.
Co., 91 Pa. .l87; Ins. ('o. v. Bradford, 49 L.
R. A. 530; Swan v. Insurance Co.- 96 Pa.
37; McGonigal v. Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 1.
An insurance agent has the implied
authority to appoint sub-agents. Bodine
v. Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117; Arff v. Ins. Co.,
125 N. Y. 57; Ins. Co. v. Eshelman, 30 0.
S. 647; Krum v. Ins. Co., 40 0. S. 225.
Where an agent has the express or implied authority to appoint other agents, he
will not be liable for their acts or omissions. In such case the sub-agent becomes
the direct representative of the principal.
McVeagh' v. Douglass, 4 Phila. 69; Bank
v. Bank, 11 Cush. 582: 1 Am. & Eng. En.
of Law, (2d ed.) 981, and cases there cited.
The only effect of the admission "that
Bradford had no defense to offer in the
previous case," is to preclude the defendant from alleging that the plaintiff was
negligent in not notifying him to defend
in that case. Strong v. City, 62 Wis. 255.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This was, at its inception, an action of
trespass on the case. The defendants demurred specially, alleging that the form of
action was wrong. In Pennsylvania the
distinctions heretofore existing between
trespass and case have been abolished and
tre-pass takes the place of both.
The
United States courts follow the State courts
in practice, pleading and forms of procedure in civil cases at law. Rev. Stat. of U.
S., sec. 914; O'Connel v. Reed, 5 C. C. A.
586; Glenn v. Sumner, 132 U. S. 152. In
this suit trespass on the case was proper at
common law. Kraber v. Insurance Co.,

THE FORUM
129 Pa. 8. Trespass is proper now. Assurance Co. v. Russel, 1 Spr. 320. Thedefendant was allowed to amend to trespass without granting a continuance. SeeMarse v.
Clem, 4 Pa. C. C. 118; Noll v. Crosscup, 3
Pa. C. C. 431Under the facts, as found by the jury in
theirspecial verdict, is the insurance agent,
Bradford, liable for the acts of the subagent, Hoyt?
As a general principle, all agent cannot
delegate his authority. So far as relates to
ministerial duties, and underan established
custom., as to his duties in general, this rule
does not apply. It is well settled that an
insurance agent with general powers can
delgate his authority to others and thqir
acts ill be as effective as his own. Bodine
v. Ins. Co., 51 N. Y. 117.; Arff v. Ins. Co.,
125 N. Y. 57; Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 135 N.
Y. 298; Grady v. Ins. Co., 60 Mo. 116; McGonigle v. Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 1; Ins. Co. v.
Eshelman, 30 Ohio S. 647; Krum v. Ins.
Co., 40 0. S. 225; Swan v. Ins. Co., 96 Pa.
37; Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364; s. c.
11 Am. St. Rep. 121.
An agent can never delegate the obligations which he owes to his principal.
Sometimes an agent has the power, express
or implied, to appoint other agents. He
may be given the power to make a contract of employment for his principal, just
as he may be given the power to make any
other contract for him. In such case the
agent will only be answerable for due care
and fidelity in selecting a competent person. He will not be responsible for the
acts of such additional agent. So far as we
can discover, the question as to the power
of an insurance agent, such as Bradf,.rd, to
appoint sub-agents and thus be relieved
from responsibility for their acts, has never
been expressly answered. Numerouscases
have been cited by the counsel in which
the insurance companies have been held
bound by the acts of sub-agents, exercising
powers similar to those of Hoyt in this
case. (See cases cited supra.) But it is
obvious That those cases form no precedent
for this one. Whether such sub-agents
were the result of a power of appointment
residing in the agent, by which the former
came into privity with the principal, or
whether the sub-agents were simply employees of the agent, would make no differ-

enceso far as those decisions are concerned.
The insurance company would be liable in
either case.
If Bradford is to be held relieved from
responsibility for the acts of Hoyt it must
be upon the theory that the former had the
power to appoint other agents; that is, to
enter into contracts of employment for the
company. We do not think that such
power can be implied from the facts as
found. He undoubtedly had the right to
delegate his authority to such an extent as
was necessary to carry on his business.
But this delegation would not enable him
to shift his obligation. Hoyt did not come
into privity with the insurance company.
For instance, he could not have recovered
from them his compensation. Fairchild v.
King, 102 Cal. 320. Insurance companies
do have agents whose express duty it is to
employ other agents, but of course Bradford was not of this' class. He was an
agent appointed to look out for the business
interests of his employer with regard to the
procuring of insurance in a particular locality. The cases in which agents have
been held to have the power to appoint additional agents, have not been at all similar to the case under consideration. They
are nearly all cases of commercial agency,
or of banks collecting through other and
distant banks. All of the cases cited by
the counsel for the defense fall within this
class. The reasons for relieving the agents
in such cases do not apply here. See McVeagh v. Douglass, 4 Phila.. 69; Bradstreet
v. Everson, 72 Pa. 124; Bank v. Goodman,
109 Pa. 422; Bank v. Bank, 112 U. S. 287.
Hoyt, then, 'was the agent of Bradford.
But there is another argument advanced
by the defendant which is more meritorious
and which, in our opinion, prevents a recovery. It is that Hoyt exceeded his actual and apparent authority in issuing this
policy. Bradford had given to his subagent the authority to perform certain
ministerial duties, such as soliciting insurance, collecting premiums, and delivering policies of insurance. It has many
times been decided that an agent empowered to perform such functions has no authority to make a contract of insurance.
Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 23 Pa. 72; Fleming v.
Ins. Co., 42 Wis. 620; Greene v. Ins. Co.,
91 Pa. 387; 16 Am. and Eng. En. of Law
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915 (2d Ed.) and cases there cited. See
also Ins. Co. v. Willetts, 24 Mich. 267.
Bradford alone had the right to perform
the discretionary act of effecting a contract
of insurance by countersigning the policy.
We have been pointed to no case which
holds that this duty can be delegated to a
sub-agent. The court iii Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364;s. c. II Am. St. Repr. 121,
intimates that if the act performed by the
sub-agent there had been a discretionary
one, the company would have been held
not liable.
The insured in this case knew that Bradford was the general agent of the company
and that Hoyt was but a sub-agent. Yet
in no part of the transaction leading up to
the securing of this policy did he deal directly with Bradford. He was bound to
know that Bradford alone could issue a
policy. The fact that he took the policy
without actual notice does not render
Bradford liable. Is one whose name is
forged to a document like this, to be held
responsible for it, because the one acquiring it has no knowledge of the forgery ?
Counsel for the defendant have called our
attention to the existence of the analagous
case of Bradford v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co.,
reported in 49 L. R. A. 530, in which a conclusion, in accordance with the judgment
in this case, was arrived at by the Circuit
Court of Appeals of this circuit.
Judgment for defendant.
W. S. CLARK, J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A policy purporting to be that of the
plaintiff company was delivered to the
Mayer Pottery Works, and, a fire subsequently occurring, the works, in an action
upon the policy, recovered a judgment for
$_.529.20 with costs S43.16. Whatdefences
were attempted we can only surmise.
They may have been (1) that the agent,
Bradford, had no authority to issue policies on potteries (2) that the policy had
not been countersigned by nor delivered
with the authority of Bradford.
It is clear that if either of these would
be valid, Bradford is not liable in this
action. There should have been no recovery in the suit upon the policy, and Bradford not havingparticipated in the defence
cannot be made responsible for its miscarriage.

Certain facts were preseu~ed to the jury
from which, it was argued, that Bradford
was not liable. But the argument would
have shown that the Insurance Company
also was not liable. In addition to these
facts we have the solemn admission of
Biadford "that he had no defence to offer
(in the trial on the policy) even had lie
been notified." The specific facts it is
urged, show non-liability of Bradford.
The admission shows liability of the company.
A little reflection will,we think, discover
either that the facts do not support the
legal inference drawn from them, or that
they are inconsistent with the admission.
In such a state of the evidence, it would
have been the duty of the court to allow
the jury to decide whether the facts were
as specifically averred, or as the concession
of the defendant implied that they Wvere.
The learned court, nevertheless, gave a
binding instruction to the jury to find for
the defendant. This we think, was error.
By admitting that the Brayer Pottery
Works ought, in law, to have recovered
upon the policy, the defendant admits the
existence of all the facts necessary to support this right to recover. What are these
facts?
The company had no contract, it is
admitted, with the works except through
Hoyt, and it had no contract with Hoyt
except through Bradford. Nothing is suggested which could give color to the
hypothesis that although Hoyt was
employed by Bradford, the latter, asagent
to employ him, employed him for the
company and not for himself. Nothing
shows that Bradford had power to appoint
an agent for the comlpang. N othing shows

that, if lie had, he attempted to exercise
such power. Bradford is agent for several
Insurance companies. He had "in hi,;
employment" Hoyt, who did all the
clerical work, made daily reports in Bradford's name, evidently, to the general
agent at Wilkesbarre, by the authority of
Bradford-not that of the company-solicited insurance, collected premiums, and
delivered policies. When the Mlayer
Pottery Works wanted insurance, it wrote
not to Hoyt, but to Bradford. Hoyt as
Bradford's employe, conferred with the
works, promised the policy and afterwards
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delivered it. The premium paid to Hoyt,
he deposited to the credit of Bradford. We
may therefore dismiss all consideration of
the supposition that Hoyt had been made
an agent of the company and that in his
acts he was its direct representative. He
was the em ploye of Bradford.
Hoyt being the employe of Bradford,
how could it happen that the policy
delivered by him to the Mayer Pottery
Works made a valid contract? Evidently
the acts of Hoyt are imputable to Bradford,
and, thcrtfore, imputable to the company.
The company acted in and by Bradford;
Bradford acted in and by Hoyt. In adwitting, as he did, that the works must
in law recover, Bradford thereforeadmitted
that in law the acts of Hoyt were imputable to himself. He was the nexus between
the company and Hoyt, as Hoyt was the
nexus between him and the works.
There are but two theories on which
this imputation islegally possible. Either
Bradford had authorized Hoyt to do what
he did', or he had justified the works, by
what he did or by what he refrained from
doing, in thinking that he had authorized
Hoyt to do what he did. It appears
rather clearly that Bradford had not
authorized Hoyt to do what he did. It
does not clearly appear that he had not
warranted the works in supposing that lie
had. This concession therefore that the
company was bound by Hoyt's act (that
being possible only if the appearances
made the company liable, for which
appearances, plainly, Bradford was responsible) is practically a concession that he
had "held out" Hoytto the Mayer Pottery
Works as authorized to do what he was
doing. The admis. ion therefore ought to
have been submitted to the jury with
proper instructions.
But, had there been no admission of the
sort, we are convinced that the facts
proven would have warranted a finding
by the jury that Bradford had "held out"
Hoyt as authorized to do what lie did;
that is, had so acted, or abstained from
acting, as to justify the Works in thinking that the policy had been delivered for
him, with his assent. When such are the
acts or omissions of the employer, it is not,
we think, necessary to brand them as
negligent in order to make him liable for

the acts of the employee. It is enough
that for his own purposes he so relates
himself to another as to justify strangers
iii thinking that the other is acting vicariously for him. If A should put a horse
into B's custody, with. instructions to sell
him for so much, but not to receive the
price in cash, but only in a check payable
to A, and the vendee should, without
knowledge of this instruction, pay the
price in cash, it would hardly be contended that he would be obliged to pay it
a second time should B fail tq pay the
money over to A. Huffeut Agency, 108.
This would not be because A was negligent. but on the ground that lie has made
it possible for B to receive the payment in
cash without the vendee's knowing of the
prohibition. A could do nothing to give
notice to a possible purchaser of the limit
to B's authority, and therefore could not
with any propriety be accused of negligence. If negligent at all, his negligence
would consist in employing any agent to
sell and deliver the horse, with such a restriction upon his power. While the person who deals with the agent must be free
from negligence in drawing his inferences
from the facts pertaining to the representative relation of the agent, in order to bind
the principal foracts in excess of the agent's
power, it. does; not follow that in order to
bind the principal there must be negligence
on his part. He takes certain risks of the
misconstruction of the powers of his agent,
whether he is negligent or not. These risks
are an unavoidable incident to any industrial activity which involves the employinent of an agent. Those who deal with
his agent are given rights as against him,
though his only choice was either to employ no agent at all, or to expose himself
to liabilities towards those who have misapprehended the scope of the agent's
power. We do not think it necessary,
therefore, that there should be negligence
in Bradford to justify a decision that he is
responsible for the acts of Hoyt.
It is urged that Bradford had not authorized the delivery of the policy, and had
not countersigned it. He might have delivered it without countersigning, and it
would probably have been valid. Meyers
v. Ins. Co., 27 Pa. 268. The complaint is,
that,-in excess of his authority, Hoyt de-
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livered a policy without action upon it by

Bradford. Let us concede, as we probably
must, that the Pottery Works must have
known that a policy, whose issue had not
been acted on by the agent, would not be
valid. Nevertheless, how were they to
know whether it had been acted on by
Bradford or not. Must they know the
hand-writing of Bradford, and determine
for themselves whether the counter-signature was written by him? Even that
would not be enugh, for there would still
remain the question whether, after signature, it had been delivered by him to
Hoyt for transmission to the assured.
Must then the Works have inquired and
taken the risk of the thoroughness of their
investigation, whether Bradford, though
he had signed the policy, had authdrized
Hoyt to deliver it? Mayer obtained the
insurance by correspondence with Bradford. The answer came in a personal interview with Hoyt. Hoyt delivered the
policy. We are not prepared to say that
it was the duty of the Works to suspect
that something was wrong, to refuse to
accept the policies from Hoyt, to insist on
a personal interview with Bradford, and
on an assurance by him that the countersignature was his own, and that Hoyt had
delivered the policy with his authority.
Nor, on the other hand, are we willing to

say that, unless Bradford was negligent in
some way, neither he nor his company
can be held responsible.
It must be remembered that an agent
may be such to make representations concerning facts, and that, when he is such,
and when he makes representations, they
will bind the principal. Mentz v. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co., 79 Pa. 475. Hoyt was
admittedly Bradford's employee to deliver policies. This function included that
of giving information to the assured concerning the facts connected with the
policy. His act of delivery was a tacit
declaration that the policy had been delivered to him by the agent, and that the
counter-signature to it was genuine. He
could know these facts; the assured could
not. In the nature of things the latter
would have to rely upon the employee.
Thejury might, we think,have properly inferred that Hoyt had Bradford's authority
to give assurance to customers as to the

execution of the policies, and that being
so, the conclusion would follow that Hoyt's
representations, though untrue, would
bind Bradford.
It is said that Hoyt committed a forgery
in signing Bradford's name to the policy.
That is a mere question of names. If for
one man to write another's name to a paper
without the authority of the latter, is a
forgery, then, to say that it was a forgery
is simply to say again that Hoyt wrote
Bradford's name without authority. It
does not follow thaL Hoyt was guilty of a
crime. He may have believed that he had
justification for writing the name. We
are not to believe that he committed a
crime till the evidence becomes clearer
than it is. But, whether the act is criminal or not, is not decisive of the liability
of Bradford. A man may be liable even
on a forged document. He may become
liable by his having uttered it in such a
form that forgery would be easy, and more
or less likely. Bolles, Negot. Inst., 78;
Leas v. Walls, 101 Pa. 57. The important
question is, had Mayerjustification for assuming that the policy was delivered with
the authority of Bradford, and did Bradford occasion the appearances that justified
this assumption? The unauthorized act.
might be the delivery, or the countersigning: and the law may criminalize the
latter and not the former. Both, let us
suppose, must exist, or must seem to exist,
in order to create rights as against Bradford. But surely the principle does not
differ on which he may have imputed to
him the delivery from that on which he
may have imputed to him the countersignature. He might have authorized
Hoyt to put his name to the policy or not,
justas he might have authorized Hoyt to
hand the policy over or not. The important fact is, that acts essential to the rise
of an obligation have been done without
authority. It is entirely irrelevant to inquire whether the unauthorized doing of
one of these acts is censured criminally,
while the unauthorized doing of the other
is censured only civilly. Itisas much the
duty of men to anticipate crime, and to refrain from furnishing the occasions of it,
as to anticipate other injurious acts. At
all events, we are not prepared to say that
no man can be liable on an act of assumed
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agency because that act has included in
itself the unauthorized writing of the principal's name.
If, then, in the opinion of the jury,
Mayer, in the exercise of caution and intelligence, was led to think, from the apparent relation of Hoyt to Bradford, that
Hoyt had authority from Bradford to deliver the policy as one countersigned by
himself, their verdict should havw been
for the plaintiff. One of two innocent
parties must suffer. He, whose employment of a too little scrupulous substitute
has led to the loss, must bear it. The case
should have been submitted to the jury.
The able opinion of the learned judge
cites a case in 49 L R. A. The decision
of that case only partially sustains his
opinion. It does not appear therein that
the defendant made any admissions as to
his inability to oppose a successful defense
to the action on the policy. With deference to the learned judge who wrote the
published judgment, we are not convinced
that the mere fact that Hoyt's actual
authority was merely to deliver policies,
'after Bradford had signed the policy and
ordered him to deliver it, vitiated any delivery of a policy made without this actual
signature and authority.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

The negligence of the plaintiff is no bar,
for defendant, by exercising ordinary care,
might have prevented injury. 139 U. S.
651.
Plaintiffs negligence was remote cause
of injury and le may recover. 92 Pa. 475,
1I Harris 372.
McKEEHAN and MOON for defendant.
Failure to comply with ordinance not in
itself negligent. Connor v. Traction Co.,
173 Pa. 602; Lideman v. R. R. Co., 163 Pa.
110.
Fact of fire is no evidence of negligence.
R. R. v. Yerger, 73 Pa. 121. R. R. v. Jerser, 8 Pa. 374.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

this case we find both plaintiff and
defendant guilty of violating a city ordinance. A violation of a city ordinance is
This
not in itself proof of negligence.
point is well sustained in the case of Lederman and wife v. The Penna. R. R. Co.,
166 Pa. I IS.
The fact that the plaintiff allowed his
house to be roofed with shingles and to be
situated close to the railroad is not sufficient
evidence to charge him of being guilty of
contributory negligenoe. Basing our decision upon that of Justice Agnew's in the
case of The Phila. & ReadingR. R. v. Henderson, 80 Pa. 182.
The defendant in this case has violated
the ordinance by running its train at the
rate of ten miles an hour. The ordinance
prohibiting a greater rate of speed than six
SEYMOUR BATES vs. A. & B.
miles an hour. This, as we ruled in the
RAILWAY CO.
beginning, is not in itself but might be
taken with other facts byjury to determine
Negligence- Violationof ordinance-Fires whether or not they were negligent, 166
by .R. 1.. engines.
Pa. 118.
There was proof that the defendant
caused its engine to emit burning sparks
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
which fell upon the roof of plaintiff's house
Action in trespass.
and caused the fire complained of in this
A city ordinance of Columbia requires all
action. At this particular point we deem
buildings within a certain district known
it a question for the jury to consider
as "fire limits" to have slate or metallic
whether or not the fire which did damage
roofs. Another ordinance prohibits trains
to plaintiff's house was caused by the enpassing through the city at a greater rate
gine from the fact that it was run at a
of speed than six (6) miles an hour. Degreater rate than six miles an hour. If
fendant ran its trains at the rate of ten (10)
so find then verdict must be for the
jury
miles an hour, causing its engine to emit
plaintiff in this action.
the
fell
on
burning sparks some of which
HARRY M. BROOKS, J.
roof of plaintiffs house-which was within
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
"fire limits" and had shingle roof. A fire
We fail to see on what ground the jury
resulted and.plaintiff sues for damages.
was allowed in this case to convict the defor
OSnORNE and KOSTENBAUDER
fendant of actionable negligence. An orplaintiff.
In
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dinance of the city forbade the passage of
trains at a greater speed than six miles per
hour, and the locomotive, the sparks from
which set fire to the plaintiffs house, was
running at the rate of ten miles per hour.
The ordinance is the expression of the
opinion of the city councils as to the
maximum safe rate of motion, and possibly
as such-though it is difficult to see on
what principle-it is evidence that a greater
rate is negligent, Connor v. Traction Co.,
17"3 Pa, 602; Lederrman v. R. R. Co., 166
Pa. 118. Buf this greater rate of speed is
dangerous, not because of the increased
emission of sparks, but because of the enhanced likelihood of collisions with objects
upon or crossing the tracks. It is too well
settled that an act of negligence which
does not produce the injury complained of
does not make the defendant liable for it,
though such act might make him liable for
a result which did flow from it, to need
citation of authorities. We fail to discover any causal relation between the
speed of the defendant's train and the
fire, nor, as we think, should the court
have allowed the jury to speculate upon
such a relation.
The learned court below refrained from
giving instruction to the jury as to the effect on his right of action of the plaintiff's
violation of the ordinance concerning slate
or metallic roofs. If the ordinance respecting speed was evidence on the question of
the negligence of the defendant, it is difficult to see why the ordinance concerning
roofs was not evidence on that of the
plaintiff's negligence. We think, however,
that in the absence of further evidence, a
jury would not have been justified in finding the non-observance of the directions of
councils such contributory negligence as
should preclude a recovery. Nor would
the mere fact that the act of the plaintiff
in maintaining a wooden roof was a violation of municipal law preclude his recovering. It exposed him to such penalties as
the ordinance prescribed, but it did not put
hint beyond the protection of the law
against acts of malice or negligence.
Judgment reversed and v.f.d. n. awarded.

CHARLES MUNSEY, TRUSTEE, VS.
HENRY WrLLIAMISON.
Banlruptey-Option-Tender.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Henry Williamson is the owner of a
hotel which he leased to Thompson &
Bro. at an annual rental of $7,000, the
lessee to have the privilege of purchasing
the propbrty at S62,000. The lessee agreed
to take the property whenever the owner
should offer the deed, which at the time
of making the agreement he was unable
to do owing to a defect in the title. The
payments made on account of the rent
were to be applied to the purchase price,
provided they exceeded the amount of the
interest and taxes on the property. The
payments made exceeded this amount.
On Sept. 4, 1900, Thompson & Bro. were
adjudged bankrupts. On September 20
Williamson offered the deed to John
Thompson, one of the firm of Thompson
& Bro.. who refused to accept it, claiming
that the notice was too short, and that he
must consult his brother before giving a'
definite answer. The next day Williamson sold the property for $8,000 more than
the purchase price named in the lease
with Thompson & Bro.
The trustee in bankruptcy brings this
suit to recover theamount. Thedeed was
never offered to the trustee, who, however,
is not now or was not then in a position to
accept the same.

F. H. RHODES and MCCONNELL for
plaintiff.
1. Right under the con tract passed to assignee. 16 A. & E. Encyclopedia 726.
Bank v. Horn, 17 How. 157; Norris v.
Lams, 1 Phila. 3.
2. Payment to bankrupt after coinmencement of proceedings in bankruptcy
does not affect right of assignee., Wickersham v. Nicholson, 14 S. & R. 118.
POINTS and IICINTYRE for defendant.
1. Williamson had right to sell. Massey
v. Blair, 176 Pa. 35.
2. Tender of performance was unnecessary. Wilson v. Buchanan, 170 Pa. 20;
Hocking v. Hamilton, 158 Pa. 112.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We have in the case at bar two separate
agreements. First, we have an agreement
under seal for an option on the property
in favor of Thompson & Bro. There is no
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ev'idence in the case that an actual consideration was contracted for, but the
presence of the seal imparts a consideration (Candors Appeal, 27 Pa. 119; Mleek
v. Franz, 171 Pa. 632) and the option is
therefore a binding contract. The second
agreement is that Thompson & Bro. will
take the property whenever Williamson
shall offer the deed. This second agreement does not discharge the prior contract (Palmer v. Yager, 20 Wis., 97)
because it was not agreed that it should
discharge, and the second was not inconsistent with the first. On the contrary it
was rather in furtherance of the objects of
the first. This then left the parties in the
same position, so far as this case is concerned, as they were under the original
agreement, and Williamson is therefore
bound to convey to Thompson & Bro.
when they choose to take advantage of the
Option.
With affairs in this condition Thompson
& Bro. were adjudged bankrupts. A few
days later Williamson offered a deed to
one of the Thompson brothers who refused it. Williamson then sold. The defendant claims that this refusal ended the
option and absolved Williamson from
any liability. The answer to this contention is determined by answering the
question whether Thompson & Bro.'s
rights were under the contract passed to
the trustee.
At the date of the adjudication all the
title of the bankrupt to "property which
prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred" was by
operation of law vested in trustee (U. S.
Baikruptcy Law of 1898, P70, par. A).
Now, the right of Thompson & Bro. in the
option was thus assignable by them (Kerr
v. Day, 14 Pa. 112), and therefore passed
to the trustee, MNunsey. As the bankrupt's
right passed to the trustee, the refusal of
the deed offered to one of the bankrupts
was practically a refusal by one who had
become a third party, and did not therefore affect the rights of the trustee. The
trustee has, therefore, a right to take advantage of the option.
But the defendant claims that the fact
that the trustee was not and still is not in
a position to accept a conveyance, releases
him from any liability under the contract.

This position we consider untenable. The
option was assignable and the trustee
could have secured some valuable consideration for the assignment. To this
the trustee and the creditors of the bankrupt are surely entitled.
We do not think the case of Kellow v.
Jary, 141 Pa. 144, applicable to the case at
bar. The decision of that case was based
on the fact that the option was not exercised for four years, the value of the land
meanwhile increasing. No such delay
appears in the case at bar and the trustee
was therefore under no obligation to
tender the purchase money. Besides, the
tender of the purchase price in the case at
bar is needless, because the defendant has
already made a performance by himself
impossible, and thereby committed a
breach of contract for which he is liable
in damages (Newcomb v. Brackett, 16
Mass. 161.)
Judgment must be entered for the plaintiff for $8,000.
W. T. STAUFFER.
J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The contract between Williamson and
Thompson & Bro. was one of sale. The
so-called "lessee" "agreed to take the
property whenever the owner should offer
the deed." The $7,000 "rental" was to be
applied to the annual interest of 562:000
and the annual takes, and the residue was
to be credited upon the $62,000, the price
of the land. The balance of the $62,000
was to be paid, when the deed should be
tendered. The contract was, in no sense,
an option to buy. The evidence is not
clear upon this point, but apparently
Williamson has the option to sell, since
the agreement was to take the property
when the deed should be offered.
How soon after the making of the contract, and after how much of the "rentals"
had been paid, we do not know, but on
September 4, 1900, Thompson & Bro. were
adjudged bankrupts. On September20th,
sixteen days afterwards,
Williamson
offered the deed to John Thompson, one
of the bankrupts, and it was declined.
Williamson was not bound to offer it, still
less after it had been declined was he
bound to offer it again. He was under
no larger duty towards the trustee in
bankruptcy than he had been to Thomp-
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son & Bro. No intimation was given to
him by the trustee that he would be expected to convey the land to the trustee.
We see no ground on which the trustee
can recover the difference between the
price obtained at the secoud sale and the
$62,000.
If the evidence required us to consider
the contract as binding Williamson to
convey, and Thompson & Bro. to receive
and pay for the conveyance, we should be
unable to conclude that the trustee should
recover the amount which he has been
permitted to recover by the learned court
below. The vendees were to pay the
money whenever the deed should be tendered. The contract obliged Thompson
& Bro. to pay this money. Though they
had been adjudged bankrupts, they had
not been discharged from this duty. It
was proper for Williamson to tender the
deed to them in order to consummate it.
Had they paid the money, the deed would
have inured to the benefit of the trustee.
As the $62,000 was a charge on the equitable title of the trustee, he would not be
bound to pay it, but might have relinquished the estate along with the encumbrance. There is no probability that he
had the funds with which to pay so large
a sum. At all events, he should have
given the vendor reasonable notice that
he had succeeded to the position of the
bankrupts and would fulfill their duty and
expect a conveyance. He did not dothis.
Nor, so far as appears, was Williamson
aware that the vendees had become bankrupt.
This is an action for damages for the
breach of the contract of Williamson.
[But Williamson has not broken his contract. He has tendered the deed to his
vendee, apparently without notice that
anybody has acquired an interest in the
contract.
The deed has been rejected.
There was no duty to repeat the tender,
and certainly not until some intimation
was given him that the second would meet
with any better reception than the first.
So far as appears, had the tender been
made to the trustee, at any time, he could
not nor would have availed himself of it.
He is the plaintiff. He must show that he
would have become the owner of the land,
and would have consequently made the

profit of $8,000, had Williamson offered to
him the deed. He has not attempted to
show this. On the contrary it disfinctly
appears that he has never been in a position to accept the deed. He has waited
until Williamson has found another purchaser, and then, without regard to his
own inability aud unreadiness to comply
with the contract, had a deed been tendered to him, he seeks to appropriate the
profits made by Williamson on the sale.
This it would be inequitable to allow him
to do.
Judgment reversed.
GRANT RICHWELL vs. POSTAL
TELEGRAPH CO.
Damages-Action by addressee of
telegram.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Richwell, a brother of the
plaintift, became seriously ill in Pittsburg.
He asked his son to telegraph his brother
to come to him at once as lie desired to
arrange some business matters with him
before his death. The son delivered a
telegram to the defendant company, paying for the same. Though the plaintiff
was well known in the community no
effort was made to deliver the message to
him for one day after. Had it been delivered promptly, the evidence shows lie
could have reached the bed side of his
brother two hours before his death. He
brings this action to recover $2,500 for
damages sustained in failure to arrange
his business matters, and $1,000 for the
worry and distress occasioned him, in all
$3,500.
GROSS and GERBER for plaintiff.
1. The addressee is entitled to sue. Tel.
Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298; Milliken v.
Co., 110 N. Y. 403.
2. The company is liable for negligence,
and the delay is evidence of negligence.
Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 662; Rittenhouse v. Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. 263.
JONES and CAREY for defendant.
1. The damages must be restricted to a
pecuniary loss. Smith v. Tel. Co., 150 Pa.
561; G-ordhart v. R. R., 171 Pa. 1; Baker
v. R. R., 142 Pa. 503.
2. The addressee must prove loss beyond
reasonable doubt. Rose v. Tel. Co., 34
How Tr. Rep., 308.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The law in Pennsylvania is well established, that the sendee of a telegram may
maintain an action for damages sustained
by the negligence of a telegraph company
in transmitting or delivering a message.
In New York & Washington Telegraph
Co. vs. Dryburg. Woodward J. said:
"Telegraph companies are, in some sort,
public institutions, open alike to all, and
are largely used in conducting the commerce of the country. When a man receives a message at the hands of an agent
ofsuch a company, and does not actupon it,
it seems reasonable that, for all purposes
of liability, the telegraph company shall
be considered as much the agent of him
who receives the message as of him who
sends it." 35 Pa. 298; 9 Phila. 88; Harris
v. W. U. Tel. Co., 101 N. Y. 403; Milliken
v. W. U. Tel. Co.
After a careful perusal of the law of
negligence, we consider this a clear case of
negligence.
In actions against telegraph companies
for negligently transmitting or delivering
a dispatch, it is universally held that
proof of an improper transmission or of a
delay in delivering raises a presumption
of negligence against the company and
casts the burden of proot upon it to show
that the delay was due to other chuses.
In the case in hand, the company offered
no cause for the delay. A d~lay of twentyfour hours is an unreasonable delay, without showing good cause, which entitles
the one injured to such actual damages as
he has sustained by failure to deliver.
U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262;
Ferguson v. Tel. Co., 178 Pa. 377; W. U.
T. Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio 303; Pearsal
v. W. U. T. Co., 124 N. Y. 256.
The next question to be considered, was
the face of the telegram sufficient to inform the company of its importance and
prompt delivery. The general rule is, if
nothing on the face of the telegram purporting its importance and urgency, the
party injured can recover of the company
nothing more than nominal damages, or
at nmost the price paid for transmission.
In the case at hand, there was sufficient
upon the face of the telegram to notify the
company of its importance. The face of
the telegram read: "Come at once as I de-

sire to arrange important business matters
with you before my death." Nothing
could be plainer than the import of this
telegram.
In Ferguson v. Tel. Co., McCuliom J.
says: "It seems reasonable that where
damages are claimed for mere delay in
delivery, the face of the telegram ought to
contain something to put the company on
its guard. A delay of a day, or even a
few hours, might cause a heavy loss."
178 Pa. 377; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Landis, 21
W. N. C. 38.
In W. U. T. Cc. v. Sheffield, the telegram was this: "You'had better come and
attend to your claim at once," imports
notice of its purpose, and of the importance
of its prompt delivery, so as to bring such
matters into the contemplation of the
parties in the contract for its transmission.
10 American Reports 790.
The next question is the measure of
damages. A party who has failed to perform his part of the contract cannot be
held liable for remote, speculative or uncertain results. The measure of damages
for breach of contract. is such as may fairly
and substantially be considered as arising
naturally from the breach, or for whatever
damages may fairly be supposed to have
been within the contemplation of the parties had they known at the time of the
contract the facts affecting it. The plaintiff has proved that he has sustained an
actual loss of $2,500 which he is entitled
to recover. U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55
Pa. 262; Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298;
Tel. Co. v. Landis, 21 W. N. C. 38; Smith
v. W. U. T. Co., 150 Pa. 561; Squire v. W.
U. T. Co., 98 Mass. 232; W. U. T. Co. v.
Sheffield, 10 Am. Reports 790.
Next is the question of mental anguish.
We have carefully considered the question, and our conclusion is that upon
principle, and the weight of authority,
damages cannot be recovered from a telegraph company for mental anguish resulting from simple negligence in the prompt
delivery of a telegram, as the same are too
rerote and speculative. Such injuriesare
generally more sentimental than substantial. There is no possible standard by
which such an injury can be justly compensated,or even approximately measured.
In this case the plaintiff asks for dam-
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ages, simply for mental anguish, without
showing his health has been injured,
or any of his faculties impaired. Fox v.
Bookey, 126 Pa. 164; Ewing et ux. v. P. R.
R., 147 Pa. 40; P. R. R. Co. v. Books, 57
Pa. 339.
The defendant undertook to transmit
and deliver this message with reasonable
diligence and despatch, and by a delay of
twenty-four hours the plaintiff has sustained an actual loss of $2,500 which he
sustained by negligence of said defendant
in not delivering the message. Verdict
for plaintiff for actual damage sustained
W. S. DETRICK, J.
(2,500).

C AND D vs. B.
.Neew trial-Does pub ie officer become
agent ofperson emnploying him?-Notary
public.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Action of assumpsit. 'Motion for new
trial.
A had a paid up policy on his life for
nineteen hundred and seven ty-three(51 973)
dollars, payable on his death to his two
children-C and D.
B, a banker, loaned A three hundred
($300) dollars and this policy was assigned
as collateral. B at the time he made this
loan held another note of A's for twelve
hundred and fifty ($1250) dollars, which
was unsecured and not covered by this assignment.
Subsequently, a year later, A applied to
B for another loan of three hundred ($300)
dollars, which B refused to grant unless A
would procure him an absolute assignment
of said policy to secure him upon the
twelve hundred and fifty ($1250) dollar
note as well as the three hundred ($300)
dollars asked for and the three hundred
($300) dollars which had been previously
granted. To this A assented. B procured
a blank, filled it out and gave it to the
Notary to go and take the acknowledgnients of C and D. This was done and the
assignments returned to B, who after approval by the Insurance Company extended A the last loan upon the strength
of it.
Ten years later A died and the Insurance

Company paid the face value of the policy
($1973) to B. C and D sued B for the difference between the two three hundred
dollar notes with interest and the face
value of the policy, alleging that B promised that said assignineots should be only
as collateral for the two three hundred dollar notes.
On the trial plaintiffs testified that the
Notary made the above representationsand
they were induced by them to make the
assignment.
The Court charged the jury -"That if
the Notary did make such statements and
C and D believed they were true and that
he had authority to make them and C and
D were induced by said declarations to execute the assignment, they should find for
plaintiff, upon the principle that having
reaped the benefits of the Notary's act B
must also bear the burden."
ADAMSON and DAVIS for the motion.
The Notary did not become an agent,
Lewans v. Weaver, 121 Pa. 267.
There being no evidence of agency, the
charge of the court was erroneous.
MCKEEHAN and J. RHOADS for plaintiff.
The notary was the agent of B, lie was
authorized by B and acted for his benefit.
Lewans v. Weaver, 121 Pa. 285.
The principal is chargeable with his
agent's representations. The d.eclarations
of the. agent were admissible. R. .R. v.
Decker, 82 Pa. 123; Furniture Co. v. School
Dist., 122 Pa. 494.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A careful consideration of this case leads
us to the conclusion that error was committed during the trial of the cause. We
cannot support the contention of counsel
for the plaintiff, that the engaging of the
notary to do an act in his official capacity
made him the agent of the person employing him.
Taking the acknowledgement of the
policy was.a judicial act. Cover v. Mianaway, 115 Pa. 328; which the notary could
not lawfully refuse to do when requested
by B. If B compensated him for his services, he did so not because the notary had
been employed as agent, but because he
was a public officer doing a judicial act
for which the law permits him to receive
compensation.
The cases of Mundorf v. Wickersham, 63
Pa. 87 and Wheeler & Wilson Co. v
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Aughey, 144 Pa. 398, bear no analogy to
this one. In both those cases a l)rivate person was employed to do an act in his pi'ivate capacity, while in this case the notary
was engaged to do an act in his offitial
capcity as a public officer, and which lie
as a private person was incompetent to do
It is true that if the notary was the
agent of any one lie was the agent of
B; Lewans v. Weaver, 121 Pa. 285, but
we call see no evidence that lie acted
as ngent; certainly the engaging of a
public officer to do an act in his official
capacity does not make him the agcnt of
the person employing him. We do not
think that the case of Lewans v. Weaver
is authority for such an assertion. In that
case all that was decided was that the
notary was not the agent of the mortgagee,
furthermore, in that case the notary acted
as scrivener in addition to taking the
acknowledgment; in other words h did
one act as a private pemoni and another as
a public officer. And Mr. Justice Green
says "there is ample evidence to justify
the inference that it was he(the son whose
debt the mortgage was to secure) who employed the sel'irene" and who stood in the
relation of principal to thelatterasagent."
The learned Justice uses the word scrivener
not notaW, so the case is authority for the
proposition that the notary acting as a
private citizen, to wit: as a scrivener, was
the agent of the person employing him, a
perfectly legitimate conclusion, but nothing is decided or even said by the Justice
that shows the notary was the agent of
the person employing him, when lie acted
as a public officer and took the acknowledgment. The contention that the declarations admitted in evidence was sufficient
proof of the agency to warrant the submission of the question to thi jury cannot be
supported. It has long been settled that
the declarations of an agent are not adnilssible to prove his agency. Relief Association v. Post, 122 Pa. 679. The notary was
not called as a witness but his declarations
were admitted, this could not be done
until his agency had been proven.
The rule for a new trial is therefore made
absolute.
W. A. VALEN'INE, J.

COM. vs. BROOKS

ET AL.

Act June 8, 1881-lfeaning of "w'ilfully."
STATEUENT OF THE CASE.

The defendants were indicted for a violation of the Act of June 8, 1881, P. . 85,
section I ; P. & L. Dig. Col. 1268, section
438, entitled "An Actas to posting advertisements on walls and buildings."
James Evans was the owner in fee of a
store-building, of which Silas Mohn was
the tenant. Defendants procured from
Moh n a written lease to use the wall for
the purpose of painting thereon an advertisement of "Quaker Oats." As part consideration, they also painted on it all advertisement of MIohn's business. The tenant was a tenant for years, not restricted
from subletting. Defendants painted both
signs on the gable end of the building.
Evans prosecuted. At the trial a special
verdict was taken in the usual form as to
whether the facts constituted a violation
of the provisions of the aforesaid Act.
WALSH

and

WRIGHT

for the Common-

weal th.
The tenant's consent does not relieve
the defendants from liability. Devlin v.
Snellenberg, 132 Pa. 186.
The word " wilfully" means intentional,
not malicious.
M 'UNDY and HICKERNELL for defendants.
The defendants acted in good faith.
"Wilfully," when used in penal statutes,
mens with evil intent, maliciously. Commis.sioners v. Ely, 54 Mich. 181; Anderson's Dictionary; 98 Cal. 268.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury: Two questions
of law arise in this action: 1. Is a tenant
for years such an owner as is contemplated
by the statute? 2. How is the word "wilfully" to be interpreted ? As to the first
proposition, it has been decided in Devlin
v. Snellenberg, 132 Pa. 186, that a tenant
cannot give a third person authority to
paint an advertisement on the walls of the
building of the reversioner, and the third
party was held liable in nominal damages.
Although this was a civil suit, it determifies the point of law thata tenant is not
such an owner as is contemplated by the
statute. Secondly, the word "wilfully"
in this Act, we believe, means intention-
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ally. Its meaning varies according to the
context in which it is use(i.
It has been held in 5 Wharton 427, that
in an indictment for arson the word "maliciously" was an equivalent for the word
"wilfully."
Chief Justice Shaw, in 20
Pickering 220, says the word "wilfully"
means with evil intent. And in penal
statutes the word " wilfully" generally
signifies an act done wickedly or with
malice.
Nevertheless, we have not been able to
come to the conclusion that the framers of
this Act meant that the painting must be
done maliciously, wickedly or with evil
intent, but rather believe they used the
word "wilfully" in the seue of voluntarily or intentionally. Furthermore, we
are of opinion that as defendants are presumed to know the law, they did the painting wilfully, i. c., intentionally. Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you will find
the defendants guilty in the manner and
form in which they stand indicted.
WILLIAM H. POINTS, J.
BOROUGH OF NEWVILLE vs. CARLISLE STREET RAILWAY CO.
Injunctions-Street railways-G(nsent of
nieuicipaliti-'s.
STATEMlENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant corporatibn was chartered
to build a street railway from the borough
of Newville to Carlisle. The right to construct its road was granted by all the
municipal authorities intervening along
the line of the road.
Andrew Welty was the owner of a farm
which crosses the road over which the
railroad intends to build and he declines
to give the company the right so to do.
The defendant has commenced to build
its railroad upon the streets of Newville.
This bill is filed lo restrain them from
so doing.
KAUFFMAN and WRIGHT for plaintiff
cited.
194 Pa. 539; 167 Pa. 75; 10 Sup. 413; 176
Pa. 559; 195 Pa. 502; 167 Pa. 62.
PEIGHTEL and PHILLIPS for defendant.
A company will not be enjoined because
of refusal of an abutting owner to consent,
it has failed to secure a continuous route.

R. R. v. Ry. Co., 6 Dist. 487; Gillette v.
Ry. Co., 2 Dist. 450.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Act of Assembly under which the
defendant company was chartered, provides that "No street passenger railway
shall be constructed by any company incorporated under this Act within the
limits of any city, borough or township,
without the consent of the local authorities
thereof, nor shall any street passenger
railway be iPcorporated hereunder which
shall not have a continuous route from the
beginning to the end." B. & L. Col. 4022.
The defendant company has complied
with these provisions by obtaining the
consent of all the borough authorities
along the route, also that of the intervening municipal authorities, township supervisors, who are the proper "local authorities" to give the consent required. The
plaintiff seeks to restrain the defendant
from building on its sireets, contending
that until Andrew Welty, the owner of
a farm situated along the proposed route
and between the terminal boroughs, shall
give his consent the company has not secured such a "continuous route" as is required by the Act. It is clear that if one
of the intervening municipalities had
withheld its consent the others would not
be bound, for mutuality of consent is just
as requisite in a case such as this as in any
other agreement. It is also well settled
that street railways have not the right of
eminent domain and the laying of railroad
tracks on a suburban road is an additional
servitude which cannot be limposed upon
the owner of the fee against his will by
the mere consent of the township authorities and the said owner may restrain by
injunction such building. Penna. R. R. v.
Montg. Co. R. R. Co., 167 Pa. 62; Penna.
R. R. v. Street Ry. Co., 176 Pa. 559. But
shall the simple withholding of his consent by one of the individual land owners,
in a township whose officershave assented
give to a borough, whose assent has also
been officially given, the right to restrain
the defendant from continuing work in
the borough or is the borough bound by
the mutuality of official consent already
given? The statute clearly indicates that
the latter view was the one in contemplation of the legislature. It requires the
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consent of all the local authorities along
the proposed route. This requirement has
been met and such a continuous route lis
been provided. True, the railroad may
not as yet pass Andrew Welty's farm; he
may enjoin then when they attempt to
do so, but as yet he makes no complaint.
Arrangements may yet be made with him
by agreement as to assessment of damages
or otherwise to his satisfaction, but if not,
in due season he will probably invoke the
aid of the court in the protection of his
individual rights as a land owner. He is
the only one who can restrain, and we
must hold the plaintiff borough bound by
tie mutual consent of its own and the
officials of all of the various boroughs anZl
municipalities. The prayer of the petitioner is therefore dismissed.
WILLIAIr E. ErMES, J.

EZRA WHITE vs. WARREN
ROBERTS.
Statute of frauds.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
One Harris owed White $100 for work
done on a schooner belonging to Harris and
as security for which White held possession
of boat claiming a lien. Roberts had a
chattel mortgage on the same boat for
more than its value and was anxious to
have White deliver to Harris in order that
it might earn freight with which to pay
the mortgage. Roberts verbally promised
White to pay the one hundred dollars to
him if he would surrender the boat, provided Harris did not pay him the $100
within 60 days. White gave up the boat.
Harris did not pay $100. White sues
Roberts.
CANNON and McGUFFIE for plaintiff.
The promise was not within the statute
of frauds. Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. 436;
Arnold v. Steelman, 45 Pa. 186; Downing

v. Funk, 5 Rawle 68; Giles v. Eckles, 9 Pa.

147.
SCHANZ and VASTINE for defendant.
Roberts' promise being a promise to pay
the debt of another is within the statute of
frauds. Miller v. Long, 45 Pa. 350; Cobt
v. Page, 17 Pa. 469; Mauk v. Buknell, 50
Pa. 39; Nugent v. Wolf, 111 Pa. 471.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

We believe the necessary elements of a
contract are found in this case, and the
ability of tie plaintiff to recover depends
upon whether the agreement falls within
the Statute of Frauds. The provision of
the Statute is as follows: "No action shall
"
be brought whereby * * to change the defendant u lion any special promise to answer
for the debt or default of another unless the
agreement upon which such action shall
be brought or sonic memorandum or note
thereof shall be in writing and signed by
the party to be charged therewith or some
other person by him authorized." Thus
if A says to B deliver goodq to C and I will
pay you for them, the promise of A would
be an original contract, and would be binding although it were not written; but if A
says to B deliyer goods to C and if lie does
not pay for them I will pay you, this
would be a collateral agreement to answer
for the debt or default of another and would
fall within the Statute and would have to
be in writing.
Now in the case at bar A says to B surrender the boat to C and if he doesnotpay
the $100 that he owes you within 60 days
I will pay it. Thus far it would seem that
this would fall within the Statute and so
necessitate some memorandum, but we
note that he has a special purpose for doing
this, viz., that the boat may earn money to
pay the mortgage that he holds on the
same.
In 111 Metcalf 401, it was held that the
Statute of Frauds was aimed at cases
where a debt being due from one person;
another engaged to pay it for him; but
where one promises to pay the debt of
another in order to release property in
which lie or his employe had anr interestas
to extricate property subject to distress on
promising to pay the amount due, it was
not within the Act. Perhaps we find more
direct authority in Arnold v. Steadman,
45 Pa. 186, where a quotation is made from
2 Allen 423: "When the leading object of a
promisor is to induce a promisee to forego
some lien, interest or advantage and thereby confer on the promisor a privilege or
benefit which he would not otherwise
possess or enjoy, an agreement made under
such circumstances and upon such a consideration is a new, original and binding
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contract, although the effect of it may be
to assume the debt and discharge the liability of another." Parson on Contracts
say, "Whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer for
another but to subserve some purpose of
his own, his promise is not within the
Statute, although it may ltve the effect of
extinguishing the liability of another."
Chief Justice Sterrett said in a comparatively recent decision, that when the leading object of the promise is to subserve
some iuterest of his own, nbtwithstanding
the effect to pay or discharge the debt of
another, his promise is not within the
Statute.
In the case before us, while Roberts
promised to pay the debt of Harris owing
to White if not paid in 60 days, yet his chief
purpose was to release the boat so that it
might earn the money to pay off his mortgage. In the light of this interpretation
and the authorities cited we would hold
that the contract is binding between
Roberts and White and that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover.
E. H. BRoCK, J.

and Harry Nollis claimed, each, S1000
with interest fron August 20th, 1891. The
only witness to prove the widow's claim
was herself. She and Sinis proved his
claim, and she and Nollis his. The auditor disallowed the claims.
Exceptions
were (1) that the debts were legally
proven, (2) they were not barred by the
statute of limitations.
JOHNSTON and KERN for exceptants.
The claims of Sims and Nollis were
sufficiently proven. Widow is competent
to prove claims of others against her husband's estate. Stevens v. Cottrell, 99 Pa.
192; Robb's Appeal, 98 Pa. 501.
The acknowledgment in the will (in
the nature of a bequest) prevents the debts
from being barred. Patton v. Hessinger,
99 Pa. 311.
ALEXANDER

and

HENDEISON

contra.

Widow's claim, was not sufficiently
proven.
Brumer's Est. 6 Mont. 115;
Heffner's Estate, 13-4 Pa. 436.
Testamentary direction to pay debts
will not entitle them to payment as debts
or legacies. The acknowledgment to be
effectual must be made to creditor. Trickett on limitations, 1. 345. Patton v. Hessinger, 59 Pa. 311.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

JOHNSON'S ESTATE.
Witnesses - Decedent's estates Statute limitations.

Jills-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Johns.,u left a will appointing his wife
executrix.
Having become criminally
Jiable for embezzlement, he was obliged to
appeal to his wife and her intimate friends
for money with which to satisfy those
whose moneys he had taken and avoid a
prosecution. The understanding between
him and them was that the occasion of the
loan should never be revealed by them to
anyone. In his will lie said "I direct my
executrix to pay to herself and to two
other persons whom she knows, debts, of
a confidential character, that I owe them."
These debts were contracted May 17th and
August 20th, 1891. He died February 11th,
1899. His will was written January 13th,
1896. His executrix filed an account, and
an auditor made distribution in February,
1900.
The widow claimed $1500 with
interest from May 17, 1891, and John Sims

The first question presenting itself for
our decision is: Were the claims of Mrs.
Johnson and of Sims and Nollis legally
proven?
The Act of May 23, 1887, See. 5, Cl. (e),
provides that where any party to a thing
or contract in action is dead * * * and his
right thereto or therein has passed either
by his own act, or by the act of the law to
a party on the record. who represents his
interest in the subject in controversy,
neither the surviving or remaining party
to such thing or controversy, nor any
other person whose interest shall be adverse
to the said right of such deceased * * *
party, shall be a competent witness to any
matter occurring before the death of said
party.
By the construction of this clause, as
declared in Dixon et uxr, v. McGraw, 151
Pa. 100, the disqualification is made to
depend not only on the fact of being a
remainingparty but having an adverse
interest. (See also 4 Superior Ct. Rep.,
267.)
In this case, the right of Johnson, one
of the contracting parties, has passed, by
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act of the law, into the hands of his executrix, Mrs. Johnson.
As to her claim, she is not only the
,'emntfinlgptm' to the alleged contract,
with her husband, but she also has an
interest, such as is described above, (dv'ersc
to the right of said deceased husband.
Consequently, she is clearly incompetent
to testify in support of her own claim, and
the claim being otherwise unsupported,
must fall.
Sims and Nollis are, likewise, the remaining parties to their contracts with
(he deceased. They are also adversely interested, and consequently, incompetent.
Their claims, therefore, rest solely on the
testimony of Mrs. Johnson. Is she competent to testify in their behalf?
In Toomey's Appeal, 150 Pa. 535, Latimer,
J., says: "By the express terms of the Act
of '87 (May 23), the surviving party is incompetent to testify to matters occurring
in the lifetime of the deceased. * * * By
the letter of the Act of May 28, 1887, interested witnesses, in behalf of theestate, are
competent to testify to aniy fact, whether
occurring in the decedent's lifetime or not.
The only interest which disqualifies is an
interest adverse to the right of the decedent."
Following this ruling, and that in Horne
& Co. v. Petty, 192 Pa. 33, we miust say:
Mrs. Johnsou's interest is not adverse. On
the contrary, she stands in Johnson's
shoes, and it is equally in the interest of
both to enlarge and increase, rather than
diminish, the funds in the hands of the
exec'utor. Her testimony may diminish
the fund, but if so, itis against her interest
as well as that of decedent. It is, however, adverse interest, and not adverse
testimony, that disqualifies.
Nor was she incompetent under clause (c)
of said Act. What she proposed to testify
was in no sense a confidential communication, hence the common law rule, protecting such communications, does not apply.
"The wife after the death of the husband
is competent to plove facts coming to her
knowledge from other sources and not by
means of her situation as wife, notwithstanding they relate to the transactions of
her husband." iobb's Appeal, 98 Pa. 501.
It is therefore evident that. the court below erred in rejecting the testimony of

Mrs. Johnson in support of the claims of
Sims and Nollis.
Did the court below err in holding that
the claims were barred by the Statute of
Limitations?
The following rule seems to be firmly dstablished in Pennsylvania law: "To toll
the bar of the Statute a promise to pay
must be unequivocal and absolute: an acknowledgment clear and definiteand consistent with such a promise and in either
case made to the ownet of the right of
action, or to his agent in his behalf."
Hostetter v. Hollinger, 117 Pa. 606.
No such promise or acknowledgment,
made by the debtor in his lifetime, has
even been intimated by appellants. No
promise or acknowledgment in revival of
the debts haviug been made, the debts
were barred at the time of the death of
The one
Johnson, February 11, 1899.
question, therefore, requiring our decision
is, Did the testamentary provision give
new life to the claims? This provision is,
"I direct my qxecutrix to pay to herself
and to two other persons, whom she knows,
debts of a confidential character that I owe
them." It is a well established rule that
where through laches or neglect debts have
become barred, such debts will not be revived by thesimple testamentary provision
for the payment of debts. This common
law ruling, found in Burk v. Jones, 2 Ves
& Beam 275, and many subsequent English
cases is frequently reiterated in the decisions of the courts of our own state, Agnew
v. Fetterman, 4 Pa. 56; Buehler v. Buffington, 43 Pa. 278.
Were these general debts we should not
hesitate in saying: "They are barred."
But we must under the circumstances hold
what evidently was the testator's intention
that by directing his executrix "to pay to
herself and to two other persons, whom
sheknows, debts of a confidential character
that I owe them," he set apart such a portion of his estate as was necessary for the
payment of these debts thus creating an
express trust in the nature of a bequest.
Such being the case, it becomes imnhaterial whether the debts be legally proven
or whether they be barred by the Statute
of Limitations. "The Statute does not apply or extend to express trusts, which
front their very nature can not be subjec
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to limitation as long as the trust is undis.
charged.', Walker v. Walker, et al, 16 S.
& R. 379. Like rulings are made in
Thompson v. McGaw, 2 Watts 161, and
Man v. Warner, 4 Wharton 461.
For this reason, we must sustain the exceptions to the report of the Auditor, not
only as to the claims of Sims and Kollis,
but as to that of Mrs. Johnson as well.
F. A. MAtx, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

There are two questions: Did the decedent owe debts to his widow, to Sims and
to Nollis? Are these debts barred by the
statute of limitations?
The only evidence of the debt to the
widow is herown testimony. At common
law she could not have testified, nor has
any statute been enacted that has conferred
on her the competency to testify. The
right of Johnson has passed to her as executrix but her claim as creditor is adverse
to him and to herself as executrix. Johnson's will, however, directs her "to pay
to herself and to two other persons, whom
she knows, debts of a confidential character, that r owe them." He thus committed to her the decision as to the existence of the debts and the personality
of the creditors. In effect, his words
make a bequest to the widow of.the money
which she shall declare under oath, to be
owing to her. As against all but creditors,
he could have given the money to her,
owed or not. He can therefore give it to
her, on the footing of a debt, to be proven
as such by her testimony. She had a
right to prove the debt, in conformity with
the condition of the bequest to her.
We assume that there are no creditors
or that if there are, the estate is solvent because it does not appear that there are
creditors or that the estate is insolvent.
Denon apparentibqet non existentibwu,
eadem est ratio. Had there been creditors
they would have claimed, not under, but
in spite of the will. The estate being insolvent they could deny the right of
another to support his claim as a creditor,
except by legal proof. As against legatees,
the will of the testator is the law. Bickel's
Estate, 9 D. R. 129.
What has been said concerning the
widow's debt of $1500, is applicable to the
debts of Sims and Nollis. Johnson in

substance gives to them what the widow
knows to be due them. Her testimony
would be the legal evidence of what she
knew to be due them. But as the learned
court below has said, she would be competent under the act of 1887. She is testifying not merely against her interest as
executrix, but also against her interest as
legatee or widow.
The debts are shown to have originated
May 17 and August 20th, 1891. Johnson
died February 11, 1899. The will was
written January 13, 1896. These debts
were barred, therefore, at Johnson's death,
unless the will is an effectual admission of
their not having been paid, or unless it
is, in substance, a bequest to thecreditors.
We think the will is both all admission,
and a bequest. As an admission it identifies the debt, through the knowledge of
the executrix. But it is also a bequest.
The money formerly due on a debt now
barred may be the subject of a bequest.
Judgment affirmed.
JACOB ARNDT vs. SARAH ARNDT.
Action in Replevi.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In April, 1900, Sarah Arndt left the
house of her husband, the plaintiff in this
action, taking with her personalty to the
value of $500, which she still retains. The
plaintiff claims the property, and brings
this action. Witnesses for the plaintiff
testified to the fact of desertion.
The defense called Sarah Arndt, offering to show by her that she left her husband with his consent. Competency of
the witness objected to by the plaintiff.
Objection overruled. Verdict for defendant. Motion for new trial. Refused.
PHILLIPS and MILLER fo17 motion.
SHxRBINE and BRENNAN contra.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be determined is whether
Sarah Arndt was competent to testify that
she left her husband with his consent.
The only grounds upon which a husband
may sue his wife are found in the Act of
June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, 3, which provides
that hereafter *
*
* (a married man
cannot) sue his wife *
*
* except
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in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding to protect or recover his separate
property, whensoever she may have deserted him, or separated herself from him
without sufficient cause. Presuming that
the proceedings in the lower court were
regular, this action must necessarily have
been brought under this Act, and upon the
supposition that the wife had deserted and
had taken with her property belonging to
the husband.
According to Paxson J., in City v. Williamson, 10 Phila. 179, "Property in possession of wife will be presumed to be the
property of her husband.

The onus is

upon her to chow that it is her separate
estate, and how and from whom she acquired it." So we must conclude that the
property taken by the wife was the separate property of the husband, there being
nothing to indicate the contrary.
The Act of June 8, 1893, further provides
that "In any proceeding brought by either
under the provisions of section 3 to protect
or recover the separate property of either,
both shall be fully competent witnesses,
except that neither may testify to confidential communications made by one or
the other, unless this privilege be waived
upon trial."
Unless the evidence offered came under
the class of confidential communications
between husband and wife, she was competent to testify. While itis true the wife
was testifying against the husband's interest, yet she was not testifying to any
communication.
New trial refused.
R. K. MACCONNELL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This is an action by a husband as against

his wife to recover certain personalty which
she, on leaving him, took with her. There
does not seem to have been any serious
question that the property was his, and
that she had no right to take it away.
The husband, however, had no right at
common law to sue the wife, and if he may
now sue her, it is only in consequence of
the Act of June 8, 1893, 2 P. & L. 2905.
The third section of that Act permits him
to sue her only "in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding to protect or recover his separate estate, whensoever she

may have deserted him, or separated herself from him without sufficient cause."
Under this Act, the desertion or causeless
separation is a condition precedent to the
right to sue. The defense made by Mrs.
Arndt is, not that she did not take the
property, nor that it was not the plaintiff's, but that she had not deserted him,
nor separated from him without sufficient
cause.
There was evidence that she had separated from him. In the absence of evidence, this separation must, we think, be
deemed to be without justification. The
act of withdrawing from him is hers, and
we cannot gratuitously assume her innocence in order to assume his guilt.
To overcome the presumption that the
separation was causeless, Mrs.Arndtoffered
herself as a witness to ptove that it had
occurred with the consent of the plaintiff.
This testimony would be against her husband, and, as well at common law as under the Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158,
would be inadmissible. The fourth section of the Act of June 8, 1893, supra,
enacts, however, that "In any proceeding
brought by either under the provisions of
section three, to protect or recover the
separate property of either, both shall be
fully competent witnesses, except that
neither may testify to confidential communications made by one or [to?] the
other, unless this privilege be waived upon
the trial." 2 P. & L. 2890.
Under the act just cited, it is clear that
Mrs. Arndt would be competent to prove
that she had not taken the property, or
that it was her own. It is supposed that
she is not rendered competent to deny the
fact which conditions the husband's right
of action, viz.: her desertion or unjustifiable separation. Without this fact, it is.
suggested, the husband would have no
right to sue, and it is only when he has a
right. to sue that she is rendered a competent witness. For her to testify that he
has no right to sue, is to assume the right,
in order to testify, and then, in testifying,
to deny the right which was assumed to
exist.
We are not convinced by thislogic. The
action predicates, it is true, the desertion
by the wife, but it no less predicates the
taking by her of property that belongs to
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the husband. If she can deny none of
these facts, the gift of the power to testify
is vain. The meaning of the Act plainly
is, that whenever an action is brought alleging desertion and the improper taking
of property by the wife, she shall be competent to testify in her defense, and to
testify in denial of any relevant fact.
Judgment affirmed.
JNO. MILLER vs. HENRY
WELKER.
Vhat constitutes an abandonment oj an
easement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Miller made a deed to Welker of a tract
of land in which it was stipulated that
Welker was to have a road over Miller's
farm to the public road. This said tract
adjoined other lands of Welker over which
he could reach the public road, consequently he did not use the road granted by the
deed or ever attempt to take possession
until about 25 years after the grant.
About 25 years after said grant Welker
sold part of his land cutting the tract
bough tfrom Miller off from the roadhowever retainingthe right of way in this deed
to the road.
Finding the right of way granted in the
deed from Miller to be more convenient,
he attempts to use the way granted by
the deed from Miller 25 years before.
Miller brings action of trespass on the
grounds that Welker had abandoned the
easement. Miller had cultivated this land
all the time while Welker had used another way to get to the public road and
knew that Miller was cultivating this land
which had been granted as a road by the
deed from Miller.
Ten years before this action a tenant of
Welker's, under Welker's authority, had
attempted to use this right of way but
when notified not to use it by Miller he
desisted in his attempt to use it. Nothing
further was done until this action.
J. McGuFFIE and G. S. MowRY for
plaintiff.
The right of way having its origin in a
grant cannot be lost by mere non-user.
Lindsey v. Lindeman, 69 Pa. 93; Twibill
v. Lombard, 3 Spr. 483; 1 Trickett on Lim.
183. The three elements, non-user, intention to abandon, and damage to the owner

of the servient estate must concur in order
to extinguish easement. Tied. Real Prop.
574; Nitzell v. Paschall, 3 Rawle 81; Er',
v. Brown, 69 Pa. 216; Butz v. Shire, 1
Rawle 218.
W. L. SCHANZ and S. LAUER for
defendant.
A non-user for twenty-one years afibrds
a strong presumption of abandonment.
Nitzell v. Paschall, 3 Rawle b2; Corning
v. Gould, 16 Wend. 528; Canny v. Andrews, 123 Mass. 157. Non-user coupled
with a denial of the right will work an
extinguishment.
Cases cited supra.
OPINION OF THE COURT_.

It appears from the facts in this case
that plaintiff"conveyed a certain tract of
land to defendant by deed in which it was
stipulated that the latter should have and
enjoy a road through the former's land
adjoining so as to reach the public road.
Defendant used an adjoining tract of his
own land for this purpose instead of the
one granted by plaintiff. Ten years after
the grant defendant's tenant under his
authority attempted to use this road, which
was refused. Fifteen years after this attemptand twenty-five years after the grant
defendant made another attempt-the result of which is this action of trespass.
The vital question in this case is, whether
the defendant has forfeited his right to use
this road owing to his failure to exercise
the lrivilege within the twenty-five years.
We think he has nct as there is no evidence of an intention on hiq part to do so,
which is a necessary element in ascertaining whether there was in fact an abandonment.
An easement is defined to be a liberty,
privilege or advantage, which one man
may have in the lands of another without
profit. (Stevenson v. Stewart 7 Phila.
293.) This privilege can be acquired only
by grant, express or implied, or by prescription, which presuppose a grant to
have existed. Defendant in this case acquired the right by express grant and it
can only be lost by non-user coupled with
an intention to abandon. Defendant contends that in order to recover, plaintiff
must show some damage directly resurting
from defendant's actions.
Now what have we in the case under
The plaintiff contends
consideration?
that defendant has lost this privilege or
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right by abandonment and the burden is
therefore upon him to prove this allegation.
It is an undisputed fact that defendant
has made no use of the road for twentyfive years. but this mere non-user will not
operate to extinguish this right. Tricket
on Law of Limitations in Penna. sec. 136;
Bombaugh v. Miller, 82 Penna. 203; Butz
v. Iluie, I Rawle (Pa.) 218.
This is merely evidence of an intention
to abandon, the strength of which depends
on the whole of the circumstances of the
case. The length of non-user is only a
material element in the case as any nonuser, irrespective of the time, accompanied
by al act clearly indicating an intention
to abandon, would effectually extinguish
it.

The omission of an owner to occupy his
house for any length of time would raise
no presumption against his title to the
property and the same reasoning applies
with equal force to the case at bar. The
mere fact that defendant saw fit not to use
this right is no ground for depriving him
ofit.
In addition to evidence of non-user there
must he shown acts of so decisive and exclusive character as to indicate some intention to abandon. Nitzell v. Paschall,
3 Rawle (Pa.) 81; Erb v. Brown, et al, 69
Penna. 216.
Nothing less than an absolute denial of
the right, accompanied by an enjoyment
inconsistent with its existence for tweltyone years can extinguish it. Lindsey v.
Lindeman, 69 Penna. 93; Buckholder v.
Sigler, 7 W. & S. 154; Tinbill v. Lombard
Ry. Co., 3 Sup. Ct. 487.
Non-user for the period of twenty-five
years, under such circumstances as show
an intention to abandon, is sufficient tb
extinguish it and even an abandonment for
a shorter time, under circumstances which
show an intention to give up an easement,
which is acted upon by the grantor and
he should be damaged if the right was
afterward asserted, would operate to extinguish it.
The Pennsylvania courts in a long line
of cases have decided that the owner of an
eausement may abandon it, but mere nonuser does not show an abandonment, to
produce this effect the non-user must originate in or be accompanied by some decided

and unequivocal acts of the owner inconsistent with the continued existence of
the easement and showing an intention
on his part to abandon it.
The evidence in the case under consideration fails to show any intention on
part of defendant to abandon this right,
but tends to establish the reverse from the
fact that the tenant, ten years after the
grant and with his authority, had attempted to use it. We take this to be
conclusive proof of defendant's intention
to hold this* right. This element being
vital to plaintiff'scause we would be justified in giving judgment for defendant.
Tie other contention of defendant, viz.:
"that plaintiff must have suffered some
damage"--we think does not enter into
the consideration of this case, but if it did
plaintiff has utterly failed to show any.
As we said above the question is one of
intention, depending upon the facts of
each particular case-Snell v. Levitt, 110
New York 604. Plaintiff has in fact suffered no material damage, but has benefited, being enabled to cultivate and use
this portion of the land reserved for defendant and thereby giving him a ready
return for his labor in selling its products
in the markets. Although unnecessary
in coming to a decision we have given
this phase of defendant's contention our
atterition owing to the prominence given
it by them in their argument.
Again the defendant was under no duty
to claim the right of way when he knew
that plaintiff was cultivating this portion
of his land. It was rather the plaintiff's
duty to refrain from any acts that would
in any manner prove destructive to the
easement granted. He improves or cultivates the land at his own risk.
It follows from what has been said, that
as plaintiff has failed to prove an abandonment of the easement, judgment should
be entered for defendant.
C. SUMNER DAVIS, J.
MARTHA ORR vs. WILLIAM QUIRK
Liability of photographerfor misuse of
picture of patron-Mfentat anguish as
cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The plaintiff employed the defendant, a
photographer, to take a picture of her, and
to furnish a dozen copies for which he was
paid.
Some months thereafter a newspaper
desired to print a picture of the plaintiff,
and induced the defendant to furnish an
extra copy from the plate in his possession.
This he did.

THE FORUM.
The plaintiff brings this action to recover $5000 damages for the injuries she has
sustained by reason of mental anguish.
WILLIAMSON

and

MUNDY

for plaintiff.

There is an implied-contract on the part
of the photographer not to sell or exhibit
a picture, and he is liable for allowing it to
be published. Pollard v. Photographic
Co., L. R. 40 Uh. Div. 345; Moore v. Rugg,
44 Minn.28.
Damages may be recovered for the mental anguish. Phelin v. Kenderline, 20 Pa.
354; Milliken v. Long, 188 Pa. 411.
WELSH

and

WATSON

for defendant.

Damages are not recoverable if the injuries sustained are the result of mental
anguish and suffering alone. Fox v. Barkey, 126 Pa. 164; Ewing v. Ry Co., 147 Pa.
40; Pa. Ry Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. 290;
Riteh v. Sanders, 2 Forum 37; Han v. Ry
Co., 5 Forum 42; Sedgwick on Damages,
103 and 104.
OPINION OF TRE COURT.

However much our sympathies may be
enlisted in favor of one whose sensibilities
have been shocked by the notoriety arising
from the unauthorized publication of her
photograph, we must declare that the law
makes no provision for compensating in
damages the "mental anguish" which
may be suffered in such a case.
In Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 ch.
D. E. L. R. 345, decided in 1889, the photographer mounted unauthorized copies of
the photograph of a customer, and having
added decorations appropriate to the season, exposed them for sale as Christmas
cards. The bill of the plaintiff prayed for
an injunction to restrain the further sale of
her photograph. The court held that it
was within its jurisdiction to grant an injuction on two distinct grounds:
(a). "I hold that the bargain between
the customer and the photographer i,cludes, by implication, an agreement that
the prints taken from the negative are to
be appropriated to the use of the customer
only."
(b). "Where a person obtains information in the course of a confidential employment, the law does not permit him to
make any improper use of the information
so obtained, and an injuction is granted,
if necessary, to restrain such use; as for
instance, to restrain a clerk from disclosing
his master's accounts, or an attorney from
making known his client's affairs, learned
in the course of such employment."
It was contended by the counsel for the
defendant that an injunction could be
granted only in those cases where there
was an injury to property in respect of
which damages could be recovered in an
action at law. The court was careful to
emphatically deny this doctrine and cited
the well-known case of Prince Albert v.

Strange, 1 Mac & G. 25. The inference,
clearly, was that the court realized that
the case presented no ground for an action
at law. In this connection we find some
dicta on this question of damages. "Supposing," said the court, "that the present
photograph actually was or that by mauipulation of the negative, or by the addition of the rest of the figure, or of a background, it was rendered a libel upon the
plaintiff, by exposing them for instance,
to contempt or ridicule, it is quite clear
that in such a case a court of law could
give damages." After a careful study of
this case, cited by the plaintiffs in this
action, we are convinced that the most
favorable construction that could be put
upon its doctrines would not justify the
recovery of substantial damages in a case
like the present one. To say that the
mere publication of a photograph in a
newspaper is libelous would be going quite
too far, and in the absence of any information as to the character of the photograph
in question we cannot assume that it
possessed any unusual features such as
would expose the subject to ridicule or
contempt. Without fully evidence there
clearly can be no recovery on this ground.
Let us grant, then, a breach ot good
faith and of an implied contract. Will a
court of law give substantial damages in
a case like the present? The cases cited
by the plaintiff as well as those cited by
the defendant, show conclusively that, to
recover substantial damages for. a breach
of contract, actual damages must be
shown. Mental suffering alone has
always been held to be too elusive to
estimate and to be too easily feigned to be
admitted alone as a ground for the recovery of damages. If the act itself is a
tort and produces the slightest physical
injury to which the "mental anguish"
can be attributed, this latter may then be
considered as a basis for additional damages If a case does not come within
slander per se or libel, it appears that the
law offers no redress for merely wounded
feeling.
In Moore v. Rugg, 44 Minn. 28, a photographer printed an extra copy of a negative and gave it to a detective who used
it in a highly imp)roper manner. The defendant was ignorant of the use to which
it was to be put, but the court held that
there was a breach of an implied contract,
that there was a ground of action, and
that nominal damages at least might be
recovered. The case is very meagerly reported and fails to state what was the
alleged loss or injury. It, however, is no
precedent for the recovery of substantial
damages.
The jury is instructed to render a verdict for the plaintiff for six cents damages
and six cents costs.
JOSEPH

P.

MCKEEHAN, J.

